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This article is an abridged and revised version of a report of the
author’s survey originally published as Gatekeeper with a Gavel: A Sur-
vey on Judicial Management of Challenges to Expert Reliability and Their
Relationship to Summary Judgment, 83 MISS. L.J. 325 (2014).
Footnotes
1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593-95 (1993); see
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147 (1997) (Breyer, J., con-
curring).
3. One major reason to believe courtroom standards may have
changed since these prior studies is that many states, evaluating
their state evidentiary standards, switched from Frye to Daubert in
the mid to late 1990s. So during the data-collection periods of sev-
eral of the prior studies, some states adhered to Frye but have
changed to Daubert since. For more on this issue, see infra Part
II.d and text accompanying notes 22-25.
4. The trilogy comprises Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.
137 (1999), Joiner, 522 U.S. at 136, and Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
5. LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FED-
ERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT DECISION (2001).
6. Id. at Table 4.1. 
7. Id. at 29.
In the Daubert decision of 1993, the Supreme Court directedfederal judges to screen expert evidence for reliability beforeadmission, rejecting the “general acceptance” standard of
Frye v. United States.1 To ensure the appropriate level of relia-
bility to admit expert testimony, the Court suggested a series of
substantive factors for judges to analyze, such as peer review
and the Frye “general acceptance” standard. Several years later
in General Electric v. Joiner, Justice Breyer also suggested pro-
cedures judges could use to decide gatekeeping questions.2
In the years after Daubert, researchers began to evaluate
how judges perform this Rule 702 reliability screening. One
group of studies considered the frequency of expert-reliability
challenges, finding that litigants raised reliability issues more
often after Daubert than before. Other studies considered the
methodology of expert gatekeeping by analyzing the proce-
dures used by judges in deciding reliability questions. Others
chose to focus on the substantive factors that judges consider
when gatekeeping expert testimony, finding that some of the
Daubert factors were more useful than others. 
Together these studies provide some baseline data on
Daubert’s effect, but as useful as they are, they leave significant
questions unanswered. They also rely on data from the 1990s,
so they may reflect courtroom standards that have changed.3
The survey discussed here is intended to address those con-
cerns by broadly analyzing how judges perform gatekeeping.
The survey was designed to answer the following questions:
• How often did judges see motions challenging the reliabil-
ity of expert testimony, and how often did they grant them?
• What procedural methodologies did they use in facing reli-
ability motions?
• What substantive factors are helpful in deciding reliability
motions? 
• Considering the guidance they had on how to perform gate-
keeping, were they comfortable doing so?
By asking judges these questions, the survey would not only
shed light on whether judges have sufficient guidance for their
gatekeeping role but could also inform judges how other
judges screen expert testimony in their courtrooms. Finally,
the survey would provide updated baseline data on the gate-
keeping role, which could inform the debate on whether pol-
icy changes are in order. 
This article will examine these issues in detail by explaining
the prior research in the area, examining the methodology and
results of the judicial survey, and then finishing with some
thoughts on the importance of the survey’s findings. By mea-
suring the practices of judges handling reliability challenges,
this survey provides significant insight into the reality of
expert gatekeeping and whether the Supreme Court’s guidance
matches the reality in courtrooms today.
PRIOR RESEARCH ON MECHANICS AND FREQUENCY
OF GATEKEEPING
In the years surrounding the Daubert trilogy,4 researchers
began to explore fundamental questions about what reliability
screening meant and how it was to be done. These studies were
critically important in understanding the initial impact of
Daubert by measuring the frequency of, procedures for, and
substantive factors judges used to decide expert-reliability
challenges. 
Prior Studies Analyzing the Frequency of Daubert or 
Reliability Challenges
In the first decade after Daubert, three separate studies
touched on the issue of how frequently reliability challenges
occur. In only one, however, did the researchers address the
absolute rate of challenges. That study, performed by Lloyd
Dixon and Brian Gill and published in 2001, evaluated the rate
of reliability challenges both before and after Daubert by exam-
ining a computerized database of reported case opinions.5
They found that in the four years before Daubert, the likeli-
hood of a reliability issue arising was between 68 and 71% but
that it had risen to between 76 and 89% in the four years after
Daubert.6 The data also showed a similar increase in the likeli-
hood of a judge finding the expert unreliable. They concluded
that these increases suggest that under Daubert, reliability stan-
dards had tightened, which encouraged litigants to file more
challenges to opponents’ experts.7
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The next year saw another database study of Daubert by a
group of researchers led by Jennifer Groscup.8 As with Dixon &
Gill, their study evaluated reported case opinions from a com-
puterized database in the years surrounding Daubert, except in
this study, the researchers were examining criminal rather than
civil cases. Yet the study only measured the frequency of admit-
ting experts at the trial and appellate levels rather than the
absolute rate of challenges. They found that more than 74% of
experts had been admitted at trial and that the rate on appeal
remained above 69%, although the admission rate varied dra-
matically between prosecution and defense experts.9
Beyond those two database studies, Carol Krafka and her
colleagues published a survey in 2002 also touching on the
issue of frequency of reliability challenges.10 Relying on surveys
of state court judges from 1991 and 1998, the Krafka study
found that litigants raised reliability challenges in a motion in
limine at much higher rates after Daubert than before.11 The
authors noted, however, that their survey did not and could not
address the general frequency of reliability challenges.12
Prior Studies Analyzing the Procedures Judges Use to Decide
Reliability Motions
As with the studies addressing frequency of reliability chal-
lenges, the most recent data on the procedural methodology of
gatekeeping had also been collected in the late 1990s. The
Krafka study, relying on surveys of federal judges performed in
1991 and 1998, specifically asked judges what procedures they
used in all cases involving experts as well as what procedures
they used in complex expert cases. Her survey found that some
methods, like pretrial conferences or hearings on reliability,
were commonly used in all cases with experts, while others,
such as independent experts or special masters, were reserved
for cases with complex expert issues.13 The Krafka study pro-
vided a comprehensive snapshot of the methodologies used by
federal judges to resolve Daubert challenges in the years sur-
rounding Daubert.
Shirley Dobbin and her colleagues performed a survey of
both federal and state court judges in 1999, which also asked
about strategies for handling expert evidence.14 As with Krafka’s
study, the researchers asked which methodologies were used in
all cases with experts and which were only for more complex or
difficult cases. The Dobbin study found that state court judges
were less likely than their federal counterparts to ask questions
from the bench under Rule 614 or to ask the parties for instruc-
tion or education on the area of expertise.15 On the other hand,
state court judges were more likely than federal judges to use an
independent expert under Rule 706.16
Prior Studies Analyzing the Substantive Factors Judges 
Consider on Reliability 
Finally, several of these studies also touched upon the sub-
stantive factors judges used to determine reliability motions,
both by database analysis and by survey methodologies. Two
studies—Dixon & Gill’s and Groscup’s—analyzed how often
certain terms, the “Daubert factors” from the original Daubert
opinion, appeared in reported cases during the 1990s. Dixon
& Gill analyzed these terms in reported decisions of civil cases
and found that judges most commonly analyzed general accep-
tance and peer review in making reliability choices.17
Groscup’s findings are quite similar in this area. Her study
found that when examining the appearance of the “Daubert
factors” in criminal cases, judges were most likely to analyze
general acceptance and peer review, although she is careful to
note that all of these terms appear less frequently than more
general terms such as relevance, reliability, or qualifications.18
In addition to the computerized database analysis, one pub-
lished study addressed the substantive factors in gatekeeping
using a survey methodology. Relying on surveys collected in
1999, Sophia Gatowski and her colleagues published a study in
2001 regarding how judges decide gatekeeping motions.19 As
with the database analysis, Gatowski et al. found that judges
were most likely to consider general acceptance and peer
review in assessing reliability challenges, with 93% and 92%
answering each factor was useful, respectively.20
Conclusion Regarding Prior Research into Judicial 
Gatekeeping
In each of these areas—frequency, procedures, and sub-
stance—research in the first decade after Daubert established
some baseline data about judicial gatekeeping. Why, then, is
further research needed? Several important considerations lead
to the conclusion that updating prior work in this area is nec-
essary.
First, the surveys and gatekeeping databases for these stud-
ies are from the 1990s, which partially explains their import in
the years right after Daubert. Yet the date of data collection suf-
fers from a major weakness: The three decisions of the
“Daubert trilogy” had not all been finalized when the data was
collected. Since the last decision—Kumho Tire in 1999—
expanded the gatekeeping role to non-scientific technical
expertise, judges may have had to rethink their gatekeeping
approaches after that decision.21
Second, when the survey involves state court judges, the
Daubert case may not be the correct starting point anyway. For
federal judges, Daubert had rejected the Frye standard for gate-
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keeping in favor of a reliability approach. But in the states,
judges had to wait until their own state supreme courts
decided whether Frye’s “general acceptance” test or Daubert’s
reliability standard would remain the state gatekeeping stan-
dard. In the 1990s, many states adopted a Daubert-like relia-
bility standard,22 but others did not, choosing to remain with
Frye.23 Since the survey data had been collected during this
transition period, a follow-up survey could capture the more
stable current environment. 
Third, while the prior studies evaluated many aspects of
gatekeeping, they didn’t and couldn’t cover them all. The sur-
vey could therefore be designed to update prior survey find-
ings and expand into additional areas not covered before. 
Finally, research since Daubert has suggested that judges
might be having difficulty with the gatekeeping role, particularly
with new or cutting-edge science.24 Whether or not this is true,
an accounting of the methodology of gatekeeping in modern
courtrooms could establish which tools are in use and which are
not, informing the policy debate surrounding Daubert.
SURVEY DESIGN
So to establish baseline data about gatekeeping methodolo-
gies and update prior work in the area, I began to design a sur-
vey tool as well as think about which judges should answer it.
The survey required three main design choices, as follows:
• Which judges should be involved?
• Which states should the judges come from? and
• What specific questions should be asked regarding gate-
keeping?
With detailed front-side planning, I could maximize the
scope and impact of the findings by making deliberate and
judicious choices about who to involve and what to ask them. 
Selecting the judges was the first issue to finalize, and so it
became necessary to decide which judges would be “in” and
which would be “out” and to have a principled reason for this
distinction. After considering the alternatives, I ultimately
decided to involve only the state court judges who sat on the
bench of the “highest” trial court in their state. These judges
are often (but not always) the most experienced, so they would
be likely to be familiar with the procedures in the study. Even
more importantly, they would also have the jurisdiction to hear
the most complex civil cases, in which expert-reliability chal-
lenges would likely arise. 
Once the judges were selected, the next step was to decide
where to find them. The selection of states offered an opportu-
nity to perform a natural experiment. By selecting states from
different regions of the United States as well as states that had
different admissibility standards for expert gatekeeping, the
study could examine whether regional culture or the home-
state reliability standard has an effect on the way judges ana-
lyze reliability. To evaluate those considerations, the study
would involve several different regions of the U.S., and in each
region there would be one state with Frye as the home-state
standard and one with Daubert as the standard. Furthermore,
the underlying rules of civil procedure would have to be as
broadly compatible as possible.25 Considering these factors,
the study incorporates three regions of the U.S.—West, Mid-
west, and South, as follows:
Limiting participation to these six states and only those
judges previously mentioned, the survey began with a total of
996 eligible participants. Each judge received a mailed letter
asking him or her to participate in an online survey and an
additional reminder after several months.
Finally, to broadly evaluate the methodology of gatekeep-
ing, I needed to decide specifically what questions to ask. To
establish the frequency with which judges handle these
motions, the survey asked them how often they see reliability
motions, how often they rule on them, and how often they
grant them. To see the methodologies of handling reliability
motions, the survey asked the judges about the procedures
they used to decide them as well as which substantive factors
FIGURE 1: JUDGES SELECTED TO PARTICIPATE IN SURVEY
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26. Thank you to all judges who took the time to participate. 27. 522 U.S. at 147 (Breyer, J., concurring).
were most helpful in guiding those decisions. Judges were also
asked how comfortable they were with reliability motions as a
way to distill their thoughts about the motions to one basic
concept. Finally, to have a point of comparison, I also decided
to ask the judges about a different type of motion—the sum-
mary-judgment motion. 
Once the design was complete, the survey went to the pre-
selected eligible judges, resulting in 158 complete responses to
all questions.26 These responses form a unique dataset, provid-
ing a great deal of information about judicial gatekeeping in
courtrooms today. 
RESULTS
In providing the results, I will start by exploring the judicial
responses to questions about handling expert-reliability
motions. I will then compare those responses to the responses
on summary-judgment motions and compare responses
between different groups of judges. 
Expert-Reliability Motions
The survey first addressed the frequency of expert-reliabil-
ity motions. I asked the judges how often they see a motion
challenging the reliability of an expert in cases with experts.
The judges overwhelmingly believed this was an uncommon
occurrence, with 32% answering that it occurred in less than
1% of cases with experts and an additional 35% answering that
it occurred between 1% and 5% of the time. The responses to
this question can be seen in Figure 2.
I next asked the judges about how they decide reliability
motions, including questions on the substantive factors that
guide those decisions and the procedures they have used in
making those choices. On the issue of substantive factors, I
provided judges with a list of the “Daubert factors” and asked
them to choose any factors that they believed are helpful in
deciding reliability motions. The responses indicate that gen-
eral acceptance is the most helpful substantive factor in decid-
ing reliability motions, with over 96% of judges selecting it. On
the other hand, judges were least likely to choose error rate as
a helpful factor for them, with only 70% choosing it from the
list. The responses to this question appear below, as Figure 3.
To find which procedures judges use to decide reliability
motions, I decided to ask only those judges who had ruled on
this type of motion before so that the responses would reflect
those procedures actually used, not those judges might use. As
with the question about substantive factors, I provided judges
with a list of potential procedures and asked them to select any
option that they used. As with the previous question, these fac-
tors were not selected out of thin air but instead were those
procedures that Justice Breyer suggested for reliability analysis
in his concurrence in General Electric v. Joiner.27 In reviewing
responses, an overwhelming majority of judges had used a
hearing with testimony presented to decide a reliability
motion, while a slim majority of judges used a hearing without
testimony or questioning a witness from the bench. On the
other hand, it was very rare for a judge to use a special master
or independent expert to decide a reliability motion. These
responses are displayed in Figure 4.
So having found what factors judges consider and what pro-
cedures judges use to decide reliability motions, I then asked
the judges how often they granted a motion to limit expert tes-
timony. As with the question regarding procedures, this ques-
tion was asked only of those judges who had ever ruled on a
reliability motion. The responses indicate that limiting testi-
FIGURE 2: FREQUENCY OF MOTIONS CHALLENGING 
EXPERT RELIABILITY, IN CASES WITH EXPERTS
FIGURE 4: PROCEDURAL METHODS USED BY JUDGES
TO DECIDE RELIABILITY MOTIONS
NUMBER WHO 
HAVE USED THE
TECHNIQUE
PERCENT-
AGE
Hearing With Testimony Presented 101 85.6
Hearing Without Testimony Presented 63 53.4
Questioning a Witness from the Bench 64 54.2
Independent Expert 9 7.6
Special Master 4 3.4
Other 10 8.4
Total = 118
FIGURE 3: SUBSTANTIVE FACTORS JUDGES BELIEVE ARE 
HELPFUL IN DECIDING RELIABILITY MOTIONS
NUMBER WHO 
BELIEVE THE FACTOR
IS HELPFUL
PERCENTAGE
Technique Can and Has Been
Tested
143 90.5
Subjected to Peer Review/Pub-
lication
139 87.8
Known or Potential Rate of
Error
111 70.2
Existence of Standards Con-
trolling the Technique
128 81.0
General Acceptance 152 96.2
Other 8 5.1
Total = 158
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28. In addition to allowing a comparison of the motions, the other
reason for this choice was a lingering question in the literature
about the relationship between reliability challenges and suffi-
ciency challenges (summary judgment). For a detailed explana-
tion of this issue, please see the complete study, supra note 25, at
335-39.
mony is quite rare. Of the judges who had ruled on a reliabil-
ity motion, 43% had never granted that motion and limited
expert testimony. For the remainder who had limited expert
testimony, almost all of them had done so five or fewer times,
with only 7% of the judges who had ruled on this motion hav-
ing limited testimony six or more times. These responses
appear in Figure 5 below.
Finally, I wanted to ask judges whether, considering the
procedures at their disposal and the factors they must consider,
they are comfortable with expert-reliability motions. Each of
these questions involved quantifying their comfort level with
the motion on a seven-point scale, with one representing
“entirely comfortable” and seven representing “not comfort-
able.” I first asked all judges how comfortable they were with
expert-reliability motions, and in response, judges’ answers
were quite varied. Only 20% of judges indicated they were
“entirely comfortable” with the motion (category one), with an
additional 35% of judges answering they were mostly comfort-
able (category two). On the other hand, 45% of judges
responded to this question by choosing categories three to
seven. These responses appear below, as Figure 6.
I also asked a second question to those judges who had
granted a motion challenging expert reliability—about their
comfort level in limiting expert testimony. As compared to the
group of all judges, these responses were slightly more favor-
able, with 65% of judges answering in categories one or two, as
opposed to 55% of all judges. In addition, no judge answered
“not comfortable” in response to this question, so the remain-
ing 35% all appeared in categories three through six. The com-
fort-level responses to this question appear as Figure 7.
The combined responses to the questions about expert-relia-
bility motions contained in Figures 2 through 7 establish some
baseline data about the frequency of expert-reliability chal-
lenges, how judges decide them, and how often they are granted.
But I decided, when designing the study, that the results would
not be as useful as possible when standing alone. Instead, I also
asked about a different type of motion—summary judgment—
as a point of comparison.28 With the judges’ responses to these
questions, I could compare the motions in many areas.
Comparing Expert-Reliability to Summary-Judgment Motions
In examining the frequency of the two types of motions, one
can immediately determine that summary judgment is a much
more common issue for judges to handle. When I asked the
judges in what percentage of civil cases they saw a contested
motion for summary judgment, a majority (52%) indicated
this happened in over 20% of all civil cases, and an additional
24% indicated between 11 and 20% of all civil cases. Unques-
tionably, the pattern for summary judgment is different than
expert reliability, as displayed in Figure 8.
Next I decided to ask judges about the methodology of
deciding summary-judgment motions, to compare those
responses to expert-reliability motions. The responses indicate
significant differences in how judges handle these motions: for
summary judgment, only 28% of judges use a hearing with tes-
timony (86% for reliability) and 6.2% question a witness from
the bench (54% for reliability). On the other hand, indepen-
dent experts and special masters remain rare in both instances.
The responses can be compared using the chart in Figure 9.
FIGURE 5: FREQUENCY OF LIMITING EXPERT 
TESTIMONY PURSUANT TO A RELIABILITY MOTION, 
OF JUDGES WHO HAVE RULED ON ONE
FIGURE 6: COMFORT LEVEL WITH EXPERT-RELIABILITY
MOTIONS, ALL JUDGES (“ENTIRELY COMFORTABLE”=1)
FIGURE 7: COMFORT LEVEL WITH LIMITING EXPERT TESTI-
MONY PUSUANT TO EXPERT-RELIABILITY MOTION, OF
JUDGES WHO HAVE DONE SO (“ENTIRELY COMFORTABLE”=1)
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The next comparison deals with the likelihood of a judge
granting the motion. I asked judges how often they have
granted a contested motion for summary judgment in whole or
in part. As with reliability motions, this question was only for
those judges who have ruled on this type of motion. In
response, over 44% of judges indicated they had granted sum-
mary judgment in over 20 cases, while only a very few judges
(4%) had ruled on such a motion but never granted it. When
examined graphically, the distinction in the responses between
these motions is clear:
Responses about the judges’ comfort level with both
motions provides a final point of comparison between the
motions. When asked about expert-reliability motions, only
55% of judges answered they were entirely or mostly comfort-
able with the motion (categories one and two).29 Judges were
much more comfortable with summary-judgment motions.
When I asked all judges to rate their comfort level with these
motions on the seven-point scale, 57% answered they were
entirely comfortable, and an additional 28% answered mostly
comfortable, for a total of 85% in categories one and two. The
judges’ responses to the question about their comfort level
with both motions appear graphically as Figure 11. 
The same pattern is true for the comfort level with granting
the motions. For expert-reliability motions, 65% of judges
answered they were entirely or mostly comfortable with grant-
ing the motion. As with summary judgment generally, the
comfort level for granting summary judgment significantly
exceeded the reliability number. Just as with the general com-
fort with summary judgment, 85% of the judges responded
they were entirely or mostly comfortable with granting sum-
mary judgment, in categories one or two. The judges’
responses to these questions appear below in Figure 12. 
FIGURE 8: FREQUENCY OF EXPERT-RELIABILITY 
AND SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTIONS
FIGURE 10: FREQUENCY OF GRANTING EITHER 
EXPERT-RELIABILITY OR SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION
FIGURE 11: COMFORT LEVEL WITH EACH MOTION,
ALL JUDGES (“ENTIRELY COMFORTABLE”=1)
FIGURE 9: PROCEDURAL METHODS USED BY JUDGES TO DECIDE MOTIONS
NUMBER WHO 
HAVE USED THE
TECHNIQUE 
(EXPERT RELIABILITY)
PERCENTAGE
NUMBER WHO 
HAVE USED THE
TECHNIQUE
(SUMMARY JUDGMENT)
PERCENTAGE
Hearing With Testimony 101 85.6 40 27.6
Hearing Without Testimony 63 53.4 123 84.8
Questioning a Witness from the Bench 64 54.2 9 6.2
Independent Expert 9 7.6 5 3.4
Special Master 4 3.4 5 3.4
Other 10 8.4 20 13.8
Total = 118 Total = 145
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Table 5; Gatowski et al., supra note 19, at 445-47.
Comparison of Responses by Judges’ Backgrounds 
When I designed the survey, I had been very careful in
choosing which states would participate so that I could per-
form several natural experiments. In selecting the six states I
used, I could split the responses I received into different
groups and then re-examine them based on state, region, and
also the home-state expert admissibility standard. I also asked
judges about their backgrounds, with questions about their
years of experience on the bench, years in practice, and train-
ing or comfort level with math and science. 
When I evaluated these different groupings, what surprised
me most was how few differences existed between categories of
judges. While a smattering of differences arose, the main cate-
gory where judges answered questions differently involved the
home-state gatekeeping standard. These differences arose in
response to two questions. 
The first deals with the frequency of facing reliability
motions, a question discussed above and reported in Figure 2.
When the complete set of judicial responses was split, how-
ever, between judges from Daubert states and judges from Frye
states, the result does show a clear difference: Daubert judges
face more reliability motions. In Figure 13, the responses from
both groups are reported, and the responses indicate Daubert
judges are more likely to believe reliability motions happen in
11% or more of their cases and less likely to believe that
expert-reliability motions occur in a very small percentage
(less than 1%) of their cases.
The frequency question provided one difference between
Frye and Daubert judges, and the other difference occurred in
response to a final question in which I asked directly: “Which
standard is the stricter one for reliability of scientific evi-
dence—Frye or Daubert?” When I asked Frye judges this ques-
tion, they were evenly split, with 50.4% answering Daubert and
49.6% answering Frye. The Daubert judges’ responses were
quite different, however. An overwhelming majority of those
judges—87%—believed the Daubert standard was stricter than
Frye. These responses appear in Figure 14.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The survey responses discussed above provide baseline data
on the frequency and handling of expert-reliability motions in
courtrooms today as well as insight into judicial attitudes
about such motions. Having reviewed the response data, I
would like to highlight those results of the study that were
most interesting.
The intent of the study was to both update and expand prior
research in the area of expert gatekeeping. The data do seem
remarkably consistent with the prior studies in the area to the
extent they have measured these issues. For example, all three
research studies from the 1990s that measured substantive fac-
tors for gatekeeping found that the most important substantive
factors in deciding an expert-reliability motion were general
acceptance and peer review.30 Judges responding to this survey
found general acceptance the most helpful substantive factor
and peer review the third most helpful (behind testing).
Beyond substantive factors, the results also are broadly similar
to prior studies on procedures too. Prior studies showed judges
were unlikely to use an independent expert in their court-
rooms, and this survey confirms that finding, with only 7.6%
of judges using that technique for a reliability motion. 
Beyond confirming prior research, however, the study here
does branch into new areas. It provides baseline data on the
frequency of expert-reliability motions and also on how fre-
quently they are granted. The study also had judges distill their
opinions about expert-reliability motions into one basic con-
cept—“comfort level”—and it shows judges are somewhat
comfortable with reliability motions but not “entirely comfort-
able” either.
The survey is also useful in being able to compare responses
about reliability motions, like the “comfort level” answers,
with another common type of motion, summary judgment. By
comparing the two, the survey shows us that judges are signif-
icantly less comfortable with motions about reliability than
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31. In addition to studying this question with surveys, a co-author
and I have been studying which standard is stricter using a statis-
tical approach. In those studies, we found that—using a database
of millions of real cases—civil litigants act in ways demonstrating
that Daubert is a stricter standard. Andrew W. Jurs & Scott DeVito,
Et Tu, Plaintiffs? An Empirical Analysis of Daubert’s Effect on Plain-
tiffs, and Why Gatekeeping Standards Matter (a Lot), 66 ARK. L.
REV. 975 (2013); Andrew W. Jurs & Scott DeVito, The Stricter
Standard: An Empirical Assessment of Daubert’s Effect on Civil
Defendants, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 675 (2013).
with summary judgment. The responses also show judges face
many more motions for summary judgment in their court-
rooms than reliability challenges and are more likely to have
granted a motion for summary judgment as well. 
Finally, the survey results can be split into subgroups, and
by comparing the groups, we can see differences in the answers
between home-state Daubert judges and home-state Frye
judges. The judges from Daubert states reported a higher fre-
quency of expert-reliability challenges than their Frye counter-
parts. When asked to compare the two standards, Daubert
judges believed their own standard was stricter, while Frye
judges were evenly split between the two standards. These
responses indicate that if a judge has used the Daubert stan-
dard, that judge is more likely to believe it is stricter.31
By asking judges about their handling of expert-reliability
motions, this study provides baseline data about how judges
decide these motions and how often they see them; in doing
so, it informs the policy debate about whether the current tools
at their disposal are appropriate to the task. 
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